

Thomas Gallo, Sr. was born on June 1, 1923 to Natale Gallo and Mary Gisappa. One of four brothers and a sister, he leaves Mary Rose Maley, Adeline Grosbeck, and Virginia Dunlap. He also leaves three sons, Natale Gallo, Thomas Gallo, Jr. and Timothy Gallo.

Thomas was the founder and owner of the McDonald Welding and Machine Co, and a member of the Knights of Columbus. Thomas was also a U.S. Army Veteran, having served during WWII.

Thomas Gallo Sr. will be sorely missed in the McDonald community. He touched the lives of many people, and was adored by all who had the privilege to know him. He was a great community leader, husband, father, and friend. I extend my deepest sympathy to his friends and family.

**MOTION TO INSTRUCT CONFEREES  
ON H.R. 2215, THE 21ST CENTURY  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AP-  
PROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION  
ACT**

SPEECH OF

**HON. JOSEPH CROWLEY**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Wednesday, May 1, 2002*

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my good friend DIANA DEGETTE's Motion in support of making the Violence Against Women Office (VAWO) permanent. Today, in the US, nearly 25% of women report having been physically and/or sexually assaulted by intimate partner at some point in their lifetime and 1 in 6 women has experienced a rape or attempted rape in their lifetime.

The Violence Against Women Office, created in 1995, leads a national effort to stop domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking. Last year they administered over \$270 million in grants to states so that local prosecutors and police departments can respond to violent crimes. VAWO has worked with law enforcement and victim advocates in developing grant programs that support emergency shelter and legal aid.

They have ensured the training of judges, law enforcement personnel and prosecutors to help them respond to victims of stalking, domestic violence, and sexual assault. This office ensures that federal dollars dedicated to anti-domestic violence programs are spent in the best possible and most effective way.

Currently, the Violence Against Women Office is a part of the Office of Justice Programs. However, VAWO can not serve as the leader of promoting effective programs serving victims of domestic violence and sexual assault policy if it is just a check-writing office.

That is why it is imperative to make the Violence Against Women Office an independent office. This office needs and deserves to have a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Director, in order to ensure that these issues continue to have a high profile on local, state, deferral and international levels.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues today: If you think that Violence Against Women is a serious issue, if you think that it deserves serious attention, then give it the priority and attention it deserves.

Make the Violence Against Women Office an independent office with the ability to make

policy and assist other governmental agencies in their work on violence against women.

I encourage my colleagues to pass the motion to instruct.

**ENRON'S PAWNS: HOW PUBLIC IN-  
STITUTIONS BANKROLLED  
ENRON'S GLOBALIZATION GAME**

SPEECH OF

**HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH**

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Thursday, May 2, 2002*

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, following are excerpts from "Enron's Pawns: How Public Institutions Bankrolled Enron's Globalization Game"—Sustainable Energy & Economy Network, Institute for Policy Studies, March 2002.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Many public officials have described Enron's demise as the product of corporate misbehavior. This perspective ignores a vital fact: Enron would not have scaled such grand global heights, nor fallen so dramatically, without its close financial relationships with government agencies.

Since 1992, at least 21 agencies, representing the U.S. government, multilateral development banks, and other national governments, helped leverage Enron's global reach by approving \$7.219 billion in public financing toward 38 projects in 29 countries.

The now-fallen giant, until recently the country's seventh largest corporation, marched into risky projects abroad, backed by the "deep pockets" of government financing and with the firm and at times forceful assistance of U.S. officials and their counterparts in international organizations. Enron's overseas operations rewarded shareholders temporarily but often punished the people and governments of foreign countries with price hikes and blackouts worse than what California suffered in 2001, causing social unrest and riots that were sometimes brutally repressed. For example:

In the Dominican Republic, eight people were killed when police were brought in to quell riots after blackouts lasting up to 20 hours followed a power price hike that Enron and other private firms initiated. The local population was further enraged by allegations that a local affiliate of Arthur Andersen had undervalued the newly privatized utility by almost \$1 billion, reaping enormous profits for Enron.

In India, police hired by the power consortium of which Enron was a part beat non-violent protesters who challenged the \$30 billion agreement—the largest deal in Indian history—struck between local politicians and Enron.

The president of Guatemala tried to dissolve the Congress and declare martial law after rioting ensued, following a price hike that the government deemed necessary after selling the power sector to Enron.

In Colombia, two politicians resigned amid accusations that one was trying to push a cut-rate deal for Enron on the state-owned power company.

While all this was occurring, the U.S. Government and other public agencies continued to advocate on Enron's behalf, threatening poor countries like Mozambique with an end to aid if they did not accept Enron's bid on a natural gas field. So linked was Enron with the

U.S. Government in many people's minds that they assumed, as the late Croatian strongman Franjo Tjudman did, that pleasing Enron meant pleasing the White House. Tjudman hoped that compliance with an over-priced Enron contract might parlay into an array of political favors, from softer treatment at The Hague's War Crimes Tribunal to the entry of his country into the World Trade Organization.

Only when Enron's scandals began to affect Americans did these same government officials and institutions hold the corporation at arm's length. And only when Enron leadership revealed their greed on home turf did it become the biggest corporate scandal in recent U.S. history.

**KEY FINDINGS**

After a detailed study of Enron's overseas activities over the past decade, Institute for Policy Studies researchers have reached the following four conclusions:

**1. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WERE THE LARGEST  
BACKERS OF ENRON'S ACTIVITIES ABROAD**

From 1992 to 2001, U.S. Government agencies—the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Export-Import Bank, Maritime Administration, and Trade and Development Agency—cleared Enron's path with \$3.68 billion in approved support for 25 projects. OPIC is the clear leader in public financing for Enron, approving over \$2.6 billion in risk insurance for 14 projects. Adding to this the U.S. share of financing for multilateral development banks brings the total amount of U.S. taxpayer support for Enron's overseas operations to over \$4 billion.

**2. THE WORLD BANK GROUP WAS AN IMPORTANT  
CATALYST OF ENRON'S GLOBAL EXPANSION**

The U.S. government wields strong influence over the policies and projects of multilateral development banks (MDBs), particularly the World Bank Group. Despite some reluctance to support several obviously overpriced deals, the Bank did provide \$761 million in support for Enron-related overseas projects from 1992 to 2001. Beyond direct support for specific projects, it also provided Enron an entrée to many developing countries by pushing its agenda of privatization and deregulation of the energy and power sectors as conditions of further loans. Other MDBs, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), also were important financial backers of Enron. The IDB approved slightly less financing (\$752 million) than the World Bank Group from 1992 to 2001.

**3. WHEN THE WORLD BANK OR U.S. TAXPAYER-BACKED  
INSTITUTIONS DECLINED TO SUPPORT AN ENRON  
PROJECT ON FINANCIAL OR POLITICAL GROUNDS, A  
RAFT OF OTHER EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES (ECAs)  
AND REGIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EAGERLY  
STEPPED INTO THE BREACH**

Enron-related projects obtained support from national and international public institutions that have no ties to U.S. taxpayers. This alphabet soup of ECAs and MDBs—obscure and often-secretive agencies with acronyms like JBIC, CDC, KfW, SACE, EIB, ADC, OND, COFACE, and CIDA—approved \$2 billion toward Enron's global expansion.

**4. ENRON'S COLLAPSE CALLS INTO QUESTION THE POL-  
ICY OF DEREGULATION THAT ENRON, TOGETHER WITH  
ITS PARTNERS IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,  
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), THE INTER-  
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) AND WORLD BANK,  
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAVE ADVOCATED**

Prodded by the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the World Bank and IMF have